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Introduction 
 Literature researching the effect of presidential coattails on lower level federal 
elections is substantial (Calvert and Ferejohn 1984; Campbell and Summers 1990); 
however, this has relatively failed to gain traction at the state-level. Because voters rely 
heavily on information short-cuts, such as partisanship, in state-level elections, the impact 
of coattails should be more profound in the states compared to the nation as a whole.  
Drawing from the presidential coattail literature, Hogan’s (2005) study is the lone piece 
of research fully modeling the impact of coattails from a gubernatorial perspective. 
Hogan’s work should be lauded for being the first to define the impact of gubernatorial 
coattails, and the causal mechanisms surrounding them; however there are some 
important questions which remain unanswered after his influential work: Are 
gubernatorial coattails as impactful as Hogan’s research suggests?  Does a state’s 
ideological composition and/or gubernatorial power mitigate or strengthen the impact of 
coattails?  Though Hogan finds gubernatorial coattails to be impactful in state legislative 
elections, it is necessary to retest his findings with updated data, and additional variables, 
to ensure that these findings are not a remnant of the chosen time frame and/or selected 
cases, as his research examines nine states over one election cycle.   
 To answer these questions, I analyze the impact of gubernatorial coattails at the 
district-level in nine states over two election cycles (2002 and 2006): Alabama, Arkansas, 
California, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. By 
examining these states over two elections, rather than one, this research retests Hogan’s 
hypotheses with a revised conceptual framework, which better accounts for the causal 
mechanisms surrounding gubernatorial coattail effects in state legislative elections within 
a given year, and over time.   
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Presidential Coattails  
 A coattail is often defined as “…spillover effect whereby an election for an upper-
level office influences an election for a lower-level office” (Hogan 2005).  Using 
presidential coattail literature as his theoretical foundation, Hogan notes how coattails 
defined in this manner have largely been tested in national elections.  Because of this, 
Hogan contends that he is not creating a new literature, but explaining the coattail 
phenomena from the perspective of a different election venue.  Moving from Hogan’s 
work, the following will highlight key findings from the presidential coattail literature, 
and explain why those findings are applicable in gubernatorial elections, controlling for 
election venue.  In addition, I will highlight the important aspects of voter behavior, and 
delineate the important variables in gubernatorial elections.   
 Prior studies focusing of presidential coattails have found diminishing effects.  
For example, research from Campbell and Sumners (1990) examined state election 
returns for presidential election years from 1972 to 1988, and determined that a decrease 
in partisanship and an increase in senate campaign spending accounted for a diminished 
effect of presidential coattails (Campbell and Sumners 1990).  
 Moreover, Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) analyzed election returns from 1956 to 
1980, and concluded presidential coattails are present in all election years, but their 
significance erodes over time.  Comparable to Campbell and Sumners’ findings, Calvert 
and Ferejohn found a decrease in partisanship at the state level, but accounted for 
attitudes towards presidential candidates, and local forces unique to congressional races 
(i.e. incumbency) as overriding factors.  Most recently, Herrenson et al. (2011) found 
evidence of presidential coattails for all Democrats during the 106
th
 Congress (Clinton) 
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and returning Republicans during the 108
th
 Congress (W. Bush), suggesting that 
presidential coattails are now an inconsistent, rather than constant factor.  These studies 
indicate that presidential coattails are an acting force in elections; however, their impact 
has dramatically been reduced over time.  Though coattails are associated with a 
diminishing effect, there are factors present at the national level such as polarization and 
candidate centered campaigning, which are attenuated at the state-level.  For this reason, 
it is fair to extrapolate from the presidential coattail literature when analyzing 
gubernatorial effects.  However, as noted by Hogan, it is important to delineate the 
similarities and differences between election venues.   
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Gubernatorial Coattails and the Variables that Matter  
 Though Hogan’s research provides the most comprehensive analysis of 
gubernatorial coattails, previous scholars (Weber 1980; Bibby 1983; Campbell 1986; 
Chubb 1988; Berry et al. 2000) have also examined their impact.  These scholars find 
support for gubernatorial coattail effects in state legislative elections; however its impact 
is constrained by year, as each fails to cover multiple election cycles.  These scholars, in 
addition to Hogan, elucidate multiple characteristics unique to state-level elections, all of 
which are important to this study.  
 First, in terms of gubernatorial elections, partisanship is extremely influential 
when determining voter preferences (Partin 1995).  Also, multiples analyses found 
partisanship to be the overriding factor in gubernatorial elections held in 1982, 1986, and 
1990 (Svoboda 1995; Atkeson and Partin 1995).  More recently, Gerber and Huber’s 
(2010) analysis of partisan responses to state election outcomes found that survey 
respondents reacted with a “…similar pattern of partisan response” in gubernatorial 
elections compared to national elections.  Therefore, due to the competitiveness of parties 
in American states, traditional party preference can account for a majority of voter 
decisions at the state-level.  
 Second, an important candidate-level characteristic applied in past research is 
incumbency.  Noted by multiple scholars, incumbent legislators have two distinct 
advantages over their challengers: name recognition and resources (Berry et al. 2000; 
Hogan 2004).  Therefore, at the state-level, the plausibility of incumbent legislators 
accruing more votes than their challengers is high.   
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 Third, the professionalism of a legislature is believed to have an overarching 
effect on gubernatorial coattails as more professional legislatures award distinct 
advantages to incumbents (Berry et al. 2000; Carey et al. 2000). The state legislative 
professionalism measure is derived from three factors: Salary and benefits, time demands 
of service, and staff and resources (Squire 2007).   
 Finally, the schema in which governors operate can greatly influence public 
policy and media perceptions (Dilger et al. 1995; Beyle 2001).  Essentially, if a 
governor’s office in a given state is viewed as powerful, governors in those states will be 
involved in more contentious and salient issues within the public, compared to weaker 
governors.   
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Voting Behavior   
 
Though this research utilizes aggregate level voting data, it is important to explore 
how individual vote choices are made.  The seminal work on voting behavior, Campbell 
et al.’s (1960) American Voter, posits that vote choices are strongly shaped by partisan 
attachments developed in the early stages of life.  The other major contribution from the 
Michigan team is that political information, engagement, and ideological reasoning was 
minimal among the public (Bartels 2008).  These claims were revisited by Lewis-Beck et 
al. (2008) in the American Voter Revisited, with the main implication being that the 
voting behavior among the public is extremely consistent, as it changed very little over 
the fifty year gap between studies.  Combined, these findings suggest that voters are 
strongly influenced by partisan attachments, whose specific votes are shaped by short-
term factors (e.g. presidential popularity, national economic performance, etc.). 
Though partisanship is argued to be a driving force in voting behavior at any 
level, there are criticisms of this position.  Most of these criticisms can be found in the 
affective intelligence framework which suggests that emotion plays a vital role in 
political decisions at the individual level.  Essentially, the scholars have found that an 
individual anxiety and/or enthusiasm is the driving force behind vote choice, rather than 
partisanship or issue position(s) of a given candidate (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; 
Marcus et.al. 2000).   
In addition to the affective intelligence critique, some scholars argue that the 
impact of partisanship has not been consistent across time.  In the early 1970’s, numerous 
scholars (Broder 1971; DeVries and Tarrance 1972; Niemi and Weisberg 1976) were 
suggesting that party loyalties were steadily decreasing, as independent responses in 
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public opinion surveys were on the rise, mitigating the impact of the “Michigan model.”  
Testing these claims in the modern era, Bartels (2000) examined congressional and 
presidential voting patterns from 1952-1996, and found that even though party loyalties 
decreased in the 1970’s, voting behavior linked to partisanship increased exponentially in 
the early 1980’s, climaxing in 1996.   
Highlighting the behavior literature, Evans (2007) analyzes a multitude of voting 
theories, but focuses on the following: Rational, prospect, and directional.  Even though 
all of the prior have different intricacies, Evans believes they are all linked by one 
commonality: “They suggest that voters’ policy preferences will be close to the party for 
which they have voted.”  Likewise, research by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2001) 
examines if macro-partisanship, coined by Stimson et al. (1995), erodes or ascends 
during economic downturns or political scandals.  As illustrated above, the “Michigan 
model” concludes that partisanship is the cardinal diagrammatic factor in electoral studies 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).  Namely, partisanship is an important 
factor in all elections; however, it even more important when predicting outcomes of state 
legislative elections.  
In all, the literature is segmented into two interrelated topics: Presidential and 
gubernatorial coattails and voting behavior.  It is clear that state-wide direct elections 
(state-level) differ from national, indirect elections (national-level); however, the 
underlying theory driving presidential coattails is analogous for state-level executives, 
controlling for a host of factors exclusive to the states.  Given that partisanship is the 
driving force behind individual vote choice, regardless of election type, coattails should 
present themselves in state-level elections.  Taken together, these findings in the literature 
8 
 
suggest that the phenomena of coattails should transcend to the state-level, though its 
magnitude is still unclear.    
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Expectations  
 Similar to Hogan’s research, the dependent variable will be the percentage of the 
two-party vote garnered by the Republican legislative candidate in each district-level 
election
1
.  Data are from races which were contested by both major parties (Democrats 
and Republicans) in each chamber of the state legislature.  
 The first independent variable of interest, gubernatorial coattails, is calculated as 
the percentage of the two-party vote garnered by Republican gubernatorial candidates at 
the district level.
2
  The coattail variable should carry a positive coefficient in relation to 
the dependent variable.  This anticipated direction mirrors the coattail finding from 
Hogan’s research.  
 
H1: An increase in gubernatorial coattails will lead to an increase in the percentage of 
the two-party vote received by the Republican legislative candidate.    
 
 Hogan’s research provided scholars an excellent foundation regarding 
gubernatorial coattails; however, he omitted a few key variables.  First, state ideology is 
expected to play a role in vote choice for state legislative candidates as partisan cues 
shape voter choice immensely (Green et al. 2001; Evans 2007).  The following model 
will effectively measure state ideology using Ceaser and Saldin’s “Major Party Index” 
(2005).  The “Major Party Index” (MPI) is measured on a biennial basis, using 
                                                          
1
 Hogan’s dependent variable was the percentage of the two-party vote obtained by the 
Democratic legislative candidate in each election at the district-level.  
2
 This measure was obtained via precinct level returns in each state except the following: 
California, Minnesota, and New York.  Each Secretary of State in these states tabulated 
gubernatorial returns by district.   
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presidential and gubernatorial election returns to calculate a statistic for each state.
3
  
Ceaser and Saldin’s MPI is comprised of six components, and weighted by percentage 
(%): President (25%), Congress (25%; Senate 12.5%; House 12.5%), Governor (25%), 
and State Legislature (25%; Senate 12.5%; House 12.5%).  After calculation and 
weighting, a percentile statistic is applied to each state, ranging from 0 to 100.  States 
with values over fifty (50) percent are deemed Republican, and states with values under 
fifty (50) percent are Democratic.
4
  Given the coding scheme of the MPI, a positive 
coefficient should be beneficial to Republican legislative candidates.  If the research were 
examining Democratic candidates, a negative coefficient would be expected.  
 
H2: An increase in MPI will lead to an increase in the percentage of the two-party vote 
received by the Republican legislative candidate. 
 
 The second additional factor is a result of state politics scholars illustrating that 
the schema in which governors operate can greatly influence public policy and media 
perceptions (Dilger et al 1995; Beyle 2001).  As a result, subsequent models will 
effectively measure gubernatorial powers by consulting Thad Beyle’s “Governor’s 
Institutional Powers Index” (GIP).  To create a measure of gubernatorial power, Beyle 
evaluated the succeeding six power categories: Tenure, budget authority, appointment, 
veto powers, party control in the state legislature, and separately elected executive branch 
                                                          
3
 To access MPI data consult the following link: http://scholar.harvard.edu/saldin/data  
4
 See the Appendix for the corresponding MPI values for each state.  
11 
 
officials.  Beyle then applies a rating, scaled from one (weak) to five (powerful).
5,6
  As 
mentioned above, states with a greater capacity to govern are able to respond to public 
opinion and unexpected political issues directly (unilateral orders), rather than relying on 
the legislative process (Miller and Blanding 2012).  Because of this, I expect the GIP 
coefficient to be negative, as “powerful” governors are involved in more contentious and 
salient issues within the public, compared to weaker governors.  
 
 H3: An increase in GIP will lead to a decrease in the percentage of the two-party vote 
received by the Republican legislative candidate.   
 
  
                                                          
5
 To obtain more information on the categorization of Beyle’s index, please contact 
myself or reference Beyle’s website directly, 
http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/gubnewpwr.html.  After referencing his site, select “2007” 
under the section entitled “Institutional Powers of the Governors of the 50 States.”  
6
 See the Appendix for the corresponding GIP values for each state.  
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Additional Factors
7
  
Candidate-Level  
The most important candidate-level characteristic applied in the model is 
incumbency.  Noted by multiple scholars, incumbent legislators have two main 
advantages over their challengers: name recognition and resources (Berry et al. 2000; 
Hogan 2004).  Therefore, with all other elements being equal, the plausibility of 
incumbent state legislators accruing more votes than their challengers is high.  The 
incumbency variable is dichotomous, taking a value of “1” if the Republican state 
legislative candidate is an incumbent and “0” otherwise.  In addition to incumbency, an 
open seat variable is included in the subsequent models.  Open seat measures if the 
Republican candidate is running in an open seat district (1 = yes; 0 = no).  If both 
variables are not included, a spurious result is possible as the model omits the Democratic 
Party, and isolates the Republican Party. 
District-Level 
8
  
 As suggested by the review of literature, a wide array of district-level 
characteristics are expected to affect the percentage vote ascertained by state legislative 
candidates.  To begin, determining the partisanship of state legislative districts is 
extremely important; therefore, specific demographic characteristics of each district must 
                                                          
7
 All variables included in this section were chosen to mirror those used by Hogan 
(2005).   
8
 In contrast to Hogan’s model which utilized an index developed from an indicator used 
to illustrate the influence partisan diversity has on congressional elections (Koetzle 
1998), I measured each demographic variable individually.  I choose this route as 
Koetzle’s indicator was developed for specific use in congressional elections, not state 
legislative elections, and as noted above, multiple scholars have illustrated how 
gubernatorial elections differ from federal elections (Jewell, Morehouse 2001; Stanley 
and Niemi 2001).  
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be calculated.  Subsequent models will include the following demographic variables: 
percentage white, percentage black, percentage of the population (18+) with at least a two 
year degree, and median household income.  In contrast to Hogan’s model, each 
demographic variable will measured individually for two reasons.  First, Hogan’s index is 
developed from an indicator used to illustrate the influence partisan diversity has on 
congressional elections (Koetzle 1998).
9
  Chiefly, Koetzle’s indicator was developed for 
specific use in congressional elections, not state legislative elections, and as noted above, 
multiple scholars have illustrated how gubernatorial elections differ from federal 
elections (Jewell and Morehouse 2001; Stanley and Niemi 2001).  Second, as explained 
in Hogan’s analysis, his calculation of Koetzle’s index yields an incorrect result, 
increasing the plausibility of inaccurate statistical inference.  
State-Level 
10
 
 In addition to MPI and GIP, the professionalism of a legislature is believed to 
have an overarching effect on gubernatorial coattails as more professional legislatures 
award distinct advantages to incumbents (Berry et al. 2000; Carey et al. 2000). 
Accordingly, the variable used to measure a state’s legislative professionalism is derived 
from the Squire Index (2007).  In a 2007 reexamination of his initial 1992 index, Squire 
creates a state legislative professionalism measure, scaled from 0 to 1.0, conceptualized 
from three factors: Salary and benefits, time demands of service, and staff and resources.  
In additional to legislative professionalism, the statewide margin of the two-party vote in 
the gubernatorial election is included as the wider the margin of victory, the greater the 
impact of coattails.    
                                                          
9
 Hogan’s index is explained in footnote “5” on page 590.  
10
 State dummies are also included to capture the effect of each nested in the model.  
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Interactive Effects 
 The first interactive effect, (Governor Coattail x Open Seat) is included as the 
absence of an incumbent state legislative candidate will greatly increase the competition 
of the race.  Because incumbency is expected to boost the magnitude of the coattail 
effect, the interaction of open seat with a governor’s coattail should dampen the effect.  
The second interactive effect, (Governor Coattail x Statewide Governor Margin), will 
account for the competitiveness of gubernatorial elections.  In most cases, more 
competitive races lead to increased voter mobilization, therefore, resulting in a higher 
percentage of uninformed voters.  As a result, uninformed voters are expected to heavily 
rely on partisan cues, therefore increasing the plausibility of gubernatorial coattails.  The 
coefficient should be negative as coattails increase and gubernatorial election margins 
decrease.   
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Data and Methods  
 The data used for this paper were taken from the individual websites of the 
Secretary of State or Elections Bureau for each state during the 2002 and 2006 
gubernatorial election cycles.  The states included are as follows: Alabama, Arkansas, 
California, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.  The 
dependent variable in the subsequent models will be the percentage of the two-party vote 
garnered by the Republican legislative candidate in each competitive election.  
Competitive electoral returns for both the upper and lower chambers of the state 
legislature were utilized in all states except New York.
11
   
 Table 1 provides the percentage of the total vote ascertained by Democratic and 
Republican gubernatorial candidates in 2002 and 2006.  There is considerable variance in 
these races among the states.  For example, in 2002 Alabama had the most competitive 
gubernatorial election, with the Republican candidate winning by a margin of .24 percent; 
however, New York had the least competitive race in 2002 with the Republican candidate 
winning the election by over 19 percent.  In 2006, the races were much less competitive, 
with the smallest margin of victory occurring in Minnesota with the Republican candidate 
winning by 1.04 percent.  The largest margin of victory occurred in New York with the 
Democratic candidate winning by a margin of over 41 percent.    
The chief dependent and independent variables of interest are the percentage vote 
totals of Republican gubernatorial and state legislative candidates.  Table 2 outlines the 
average Republican percentage for both governor and state legislative candidates, and 
                                                          
11
 Only lower-chamber district-level for the governor were available.  
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similar to the prior tables, they also display a vast amount of variance among percentile 
ranges and vote totals.   
Demographic statistics came from the United States Census Bureau’s American 
Community Survey.  To mirror Hogan’s analysis, non-presidential elections were chosen 
as gubernatorial coattails are more likely to be observed during this time frame. 
 To further imitate Hogan’s research, and given the cross-sectional nature of the 
data, I utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.  
 = a + b Xi + e     
Though a fixed effects model would be ideal, the data is not truly panel based, as some 
districts having two-party competition in 2002, do not in 2006, and vice versa.  As a 
result, to capture the within state variation, dummy variables for each state were created.      
  
17 
 
Results 
 Beginning with Table 3 (2006 and 2002 data integrated), I can confirm Hogan’s 
findings and my first hypothesis, as the coattails’ coefficient was highly significant (p < 
.001) in all instances.  Each column in Tables 3, 4, and 5 is defined by each state-level 
variable, as there is a modest amount of correlation between the three measures.  Similar 
to Hogan’s research, the effect of gubernatorial coattails is modest, ranging from .362 to 
.421, with an average of .40 percent.  Clearly this is a modest impact, but given the 
competitiveness of gubernatorial and state legislative races, the presence of a coattail 
effect could push a candidate to victory.  Moving to Tables 4 (2006 data only) and 5 
(2002 data only), the coattail coefficient maintains its statistical impact (p < .001), though 
it’s magnitude is higher in 2002 (.460 average) compared to 2006 (.323 average).  This 
difference highlights the key advantage of this data as it allows for a greater 
understanding of coattails at different points in time, instead of the aggregative approach 
present in Hogan’s research.  In terms of substantive effects, the coattails coefficient is 
associated with the largest maximum effect among the main independent variable, with 
an impact of 36.4.  Clearly, coattails can have a substantial impact when the governor 
garners a large percentage of votes at the district-level.   
 Regarding the second hypothesis, the MPI coefficient was highly significant (p < 
.001), and in the desired direction in all models (See Model 2 in Tables 3, 4, and 5).  
Similar to the coattails coefficient, the MPI coefficient carried a modest average impact 
of .33 percent.  Though this finding is of little importance in highly Democratic and 
Republican districts, it is meaningful in competitive districts, as votes cast strictly from 
an ideological perspective could secure a victory.  The maximum effect of the MPI 
18 
 
variable is 7.359.  In other words, the largest predicted change in the amount of votes 
ascertained by Republican state legislative candidates is 7.359, when going from the 
minimum value of MPI (42.5 in California) to the maximum value of MPI (64.8 in 
Wyoming).  This substantive finding indicates the variation in ideology among the states, 
and points to the increased importance of partisanship in state-level elections.  Given the 
significance, and maximum effect of the MPI coefficient, it is clear that state ideology 
plays a role in vote choice for state legislative candidates, as partisan cues can shape 
voter choice immensely.     
 The final hypothesis, regarding Beyle’s GIP Index, was proven to be statistically 
significant in all instances (p < .05), and highly impactful, with a negative, average effect 
of 4.5 percent, suggesting that “powerful” governors weaken their standing with the 
public over time as they are involved in more contentious and salient issues, compared to 
weaker governors (See Model 3 in Tables 3, 4, and 5).  The maximum effect associated 
with Beyle’s GIP index is 6.3, the lowest among the main independent variables.  Though 
GIP is associated with a modest maximum effect, this is not surprising, as the index 
ranges from one to five.  These findings advance the literature on gubernatorial coattails, 
indicating that the institutional design of the executive branch in each state can contribute 
to the success or failure of the party affiliated candidates in legislative elections.    
 Looking at the interactive models, three findings are worth mentioning.
12
  First, 
mirroring Hogan’s research, coattails remain significant when interacted with an open 
seat, though the magnitude is nearly cut in half in the combined model.  A second 
                                                          
12
 In Table 6, each column is defined by the data used. Column 1 is the integrated data, 
Column 2 uses 2006 data only, and Column 3 utilizes 2002 data only.   
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finding, which departs from Hogan’s research, regards the inconclusive effect of 
competitive gubernatorial elections.  In the combined and 2006 models, the statewide 
margin coefficient is positive and significant (p < .05).  However, in 2002, the coefficient 
changes direction, and increases in significance, signaling to the uniqueness of each 
election cycle.  Finally, the interaction between coattails and statewide margin produces a 
minimal effect, though it is significant in 2006 and 2002.  This finding contrasts Hogan’s 
research which found a highly significant, negative effect, signaling that coattails are 
stronger in competitive elections.  Moreover, this difference suggests that 
competitiveness of gubernatorial elections is of minimal importance when explaining 
coattail effects.   
 Removing all state-level characteristics present in the prior models, I created 
dummy variables for each state to determine the impact of each state within the model.
13
  
The finding of note in Table 7 is the increased impact of coattails when looking at the 
individual years
14
.  In 2006 the coattail variable was .749, and in 2002 .612.  These 
coefficients double the size of prior coattail coefficients.  This finding suggests the need 
for true panel data, so that a fixed effect model can be utilized to tease out the difference 
between and within states and years.    
 Additionally, the significance of each state variable is constrained by year.  For 
example, in 2002, Texas is significant (p < .05), but insignificant in 2006, and in the 
combined year model.  Moreover, Arkansas is highly significant in the combined year 
                                                          
13
 Alabama, coded as 1, serves as the base for which the dummy variables should be 
interpreted.  
14
 In Table 7, each column is defined by the data used. Column 1 is the integrated data, 
Column 2 uses 2006 data only, and Column 3 utilizes 2002 data only.   
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model and 2002, but insignificant in 2006.  These findings echo the need for more 
concise data to fully explain the coattail phenomena in state legislative elections.   
 Lastly, Table 8 models gubernatorial coattails in states where the Republican 
gubernatorial candidate secured victory.  Modeling coattails from this perspective is 
necessary as prior research has failed to tease differences in coattail magnitude between 
winning and losing gubernatorial candidates.  As seen in Table 8, the average magnitude 
of coattails for winning Republican candidates is .57 percent, a modest increase over the 
.40 average effect of coattails seen in Table 3.  Also of note is that the constant maximum 
effect of the coattails coefficient (36.4) stays the same even when isolating states where 
the Republican gubernatorial candidate was victorious.   
 
  
21 
 
Discussion  
 The purpose of this research was to reaffirm and expand on Hogan’s (2005) 
research on gubernatorial coattails.  As illustrated in the above models, coattails have 
remained a modest factor in state legislative elections.  More importantly, the addition of 
variables capturing a state’s ideology and a governor’s institutional powers has added 
substantially to the field’s knowledge of state legislative elections.  Since governors can 
be viewed as the party leader in a given state, it is an important to recognize that the 
institutional design of the executive branch in each state can contribute to the success or 
failure of party affiliated candidates in state legislative elections.  The significant 
coefficients of MPI and GIP indicate that partisan cues and institutional factors are 
prominent influences in gubernatorial elections (Beyle 2001; Green et al. 2001; Ceaser 
and Saldin 2005; Evans 2007). 
 Though this research reaffirmed the importance of gubernatorial coattails, future 
research is still needed for a variety of reasons.  First, there is an eight year gap between 
the data frame in this research and Hogan’s.  This may explain the insignificance of 
demographic variables as Hogan consulted data from the 1990 U.S. Census and a 1994 
publishing of The Almanac of State Legislatures, while this research utilized data derived 
from updated American Community Surveys accessible via the U.S. Census.  Second, 
though tedious to compile, nearly every state has precinct level returns available.  If more 
data were compiled and utilized, researchers could model a more complete view of 
coattails, rather than a brief insight.  Adding to this point, more sophisticated modeling is 
needed to better understand the effects of coattails.  Though this data and Hogan’s 
provides researchers with a good foundation for understanding coattails, panel data and 
22 
 
the use of fixed-effects modeling would allow researchers to more effectively tease out 
the differences within state and within year.   
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Conclusion 
 Only Hogan (2005) has attempted to fully conceptualize how gubernatorial 
coattail effects operate at the state-level.  Though successful in determining the important 
casual mechanisms underpinning gubernatorial coattails, his research left some important 
questions unanswered.  The purpose of this research was to answer these questions by 
examining the temporal and state-based trends of gubernatorial coattails.  By using this 
framework, this research has answered these questions, by confirming the modest impact 
of coattails, and illustrating the importance of each state’s ideology and gubernatorial 
power in the causal framework.  These findings emphasize the increased importance of 
party identification at the state-level, consistent with the “Michigan model,” while 
distinguishing that more powerful governors become highly involved in more salient and 
contentious issues among the public, minimizing their coattail effect.  Most importantly, 
these findings emphasize the temporal and state-based trends of gubernatorial coattails, 
providing a more nuanced theoretical and empirical foundation to the field’s 
understanding this phenomena. 
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Appendix  
Table 1.  2006  and 2002 Gubernatorial Election Returns 
State 
 Rep Votes 
Received 
Rep % Received 
(2-Party) 
Dem Votes 
Received 
 Dem % Received 
(2-Party) 
Margin of 
Victory 
      AL '06 718327 58.02 519827 41.98 16.04 
      AR '06 315040 42.24 430765 57.76 15.52 
      CA '06 4850157 58.95 3376732 41.05 17.9 
      MN '06 1028568 50.52 1007460 49.48 1.04 
      NY '06 1274335 29.22 3086709 70.78 41.56 
      OK '06 310327 33.5 616135 66.5 33 
      TN '06 540853 30.24 1247491 69.76 39.52 
      TX '06 1716792 56.71 1310337 43.29 13.42 
      WY '06 58100 30.01 135516 69.99 39.98 
      AL'02 672225 50.12 669105 49.88 0.24 
      AR '02 427082 53.03 378250 46.97 6.06 
      CA '02 3169801 47.29 3533490 52.71 5.42 
      MN '02 999473 54.89 821268 45.11 9.78 
      NY '02 2262255 59.59 1534064 40.41 19.18 
      OK '02 441277 49.61 448143 50.39 0.78 
      TN '02 786803 48.45 837284 51.55 3.1 
      TX '02 2632591 59.13 1819798 40.87 18.26 
      WY '02 88873 48.96 92662 51.04 2.08 
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Table 2.  2006 and 2002 District-Level Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Received 
by Republican State Legislative and Gubernatorial Candidates 
 
 
 
State Legislator and Senator Governor 
 
        State Average S.D. Range Average S.D. Range N 
        AL '06 47.13 15.84 19-78 57.33 12.01 23-80 63 
        AR '06 41.99 10.91 22-64 42.5 8.58 27-59 33 
        CA '06 42.82 17.44 Jan-72 54.81 13.59 17-76 89 
        MN '06 42.92 13.95 Sep-70 45.63 12.18 Dec-65 194 
        NY '06 35.17 21.29 Mar-68 26.69 13.31 Mar-50 106 
        OK '06 51.8 13.68 18-75 32.85 6.77 14-48 62 
        TN '06 47.9 14.34 16-72 30.69 7.23 Sep-42 51 
        TX '06 53.58 11.99 26-75 61.67 9.87 39-87 77 
        WY '06 51.59 12.63 34-82 27.22 6.04 18-41 23 
        AL '02 50.2 16.02 19-82 49.13 14.56 Apr-94 72 
        AR '02 48.21 11.75 23-68 56.51 7.28 38-71 44 
        CA '02 44.34 17.95 Sep-76 41.98 13.98 Oct-65 86 
        MN '02 47.92 13.91 Dec-72 44.19 10.88 13-63 189 
        NY '02 39.18 22.78 Mar-76 56.84 21.08 Jul-89 108 
        OK '02 47.5 16.35 13-82 48.15 10.58 Dec-70 65 
        TN '02 47.12 14.2 19-79 47.36 8.36 18-64 64 
        TX '02 54.21 14.76 25-80 59.09 12.33 26-81 79 
        
WY '02 54.54 13.61 34-86 45.26 9.8 29-65 36 
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Table 3.  Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican 
State Legislative Candidates (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors 
in Parenthesis) 
 Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  
      
Coattails 0.420***  0.421***  0.362*** 
 {.023}  {.023}  {.025} 
      
Incumbent 18.163***  17.788***  18.344*** 
 {.700}  {.702}  {.688} 
      
Open Seat 9.49***  9.594***  9.404*** 
 {.698}  {.692}  {.691} 
      
White 0.143***  0.136***  0.206*** 
 {.035}  {.033}  {.033} 
      
Black -0.042  -0.032  -0.006 
 {.045}  {.044}  {.043} 
      
Hispanic -0.013  -0.041+  -0.029 
 {.024}  {.024}  {.024} 
      
Median Household Income 0**  0**  0*** 
 {0}  {0}  {0} 
      
Education -0.107***  -0.123***  -0.095*** 
 {.030}  {.030}  {.029} 
      
Leg. Pro -6.532***  -  - 
 {2.041}     
      
     - 
MPI -  0.336***   
   {.048}   
      
Beyle -  -  -4.479*** 
     {.711} 
      
Constant 9.224**  -8.528**  19.975*** 
 {3.514}  {3.807}  {4.134} 
      
R-squared .663  .671  .673 
N 1395  1395  1395 
   
Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 4.  Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican 
State Legislative Candidates, 2006 Only (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
      
Coattails 0.336***  0.35***  0.282*** 
 {.027}  {.027}  {.034} 
      
Incumbent 18.534***  17.947***  18.707*** 
 {.923}  {.926}  {.906} 
      
Open Seat 9.687***  9.655***  9.336*** 
 {.979}  {.947}  {.985} 
      
White 0.149***  0.123**  0.18*** 
 {.046}  {.043}  {.044} 
      
Black -0.043  -0.059  -0.037 
 {.054}  {.051}  {.054} 
      
Hispanic -0.09**  -0.106***  -0.095** 
 {.033}  {.031}  (.032} 
      
Median Household Income 0***  0***  0*** 
 {0}  {0}  {0} 
      
Education -0.264***  -0.274***  -0.256*** 
 {.045}  {.044}  {.044} 
      
Leg. Pro -2.773  -  - 
 {2.899}     
      
MPI -  0.36***  - 
   {.074}   
      
Beyle -  -  -3.173** 
     {1.017} 
      
Constant 13.661**  -2.763  22.957*** 
 {4.747}  {5.397}  {5.946} 
      
R-Squared .703  .714  .708 
      
N 652  652  652 
 
      Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 5.  Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican 
State Legislative Candidates, 2002 Only (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
      
Coattails 0.493***  0.473***  0.416*** 
 {.039}  {.040}  {.039} 
      
Incumbent 17.801***  17.805***  18.194*** 
 {1.019}  {1.031}  {1.011} 
      
Open Seat 9.113***  9.397***  9.381*** 
 {.987}  {1.00}  {.947} 
      
White 0.122*  0.17***  0.245*** 
 {.052}  {.048}  {.047} 
      
Black -0.035  0.016  0.057 
 {.069}  {.068}  {.065} 
      
Hispanic 0.056+  0.025  0.041 
 {.032}  {.032}  {.033} 
      
Median Household Income 0**  0**  0*** 
 {0}  {0}  {0} 
      
Education -0.036  -0.054  -0.029 
 {.039}  {.039}  {.037} 
      
Leg. Pro -11.649***  -  - 
 {2.853}     
      
MPI -  0.303***  - 
   {.058}   
      
Beyle -  -  -6.43*** 
     {1.009} 
      
Constant 5.096  -15.196**  16.493** 
 {4.957}  {4.976}  {5.420} 
      
R-squared .644  .645  .665 
      
N 743  743  743 
 
Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 6.  Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican 
State Legislative Candidates with Interaction (Unstandardized Coefficients, 
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
 
 
Model 1 
(Combined)  
Model 2 
(2006)  
Model 3 
(2002) 
      
Coattails 0.385***  0.378***  0.423*** 
 {.045}  {.043}  {.063} 
      
Coattails x Open Seat 0.223***  0.147**  0.308*** 
 {.042}  {.054}  {.065} 
      
Statewide Governor Margin 0.142*  0.139*  -0.025*** 
 {.069}  {.055}  {.006} 
      
Coattail x Statewide Governor 
Margin 0.001  0.007***  0** 
 {.002}  {.001}  {0} 
      
Incumbent 19.001***  17.611***  18.835*** 
 {.734}  {.932}  {1.046} 
      
Open Seat -0.624  1.916  -6.171+ 
 {2.013}  {2.295}  {3.255} 
      
White 0.08*  0.054  0.203*** 
 {.035}  {.038}  {.047} 
      
Black -0.106*  -0.128**  0.059 
 {.045}  {.044}  {.066} 
      
Hispanic -0.037  -0.059*  0.169*** 
 {.024}  {.031}  {.031} 
      
Median Household Income 0  0**  0*** 
 {0}  {0}  {0} 
      
Education -0.088**  -0.118***  0.02 
 {.029}  {.037}  {.035} 
      
Leg. Pro -11.447***  -18.637***  -8.925*** 
 {2.091}  {2.845}  {2.475} 
      
Constant 15.945***  13.504***  1.147 
 {3.630}  {4.010}  {5.074} 
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R-Squared .685 .786 .688 
      
N 1395  652  743 
 
     Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 7.  Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican 
State Legislative Candidates, State Dummies (Unstandardized Coefficients, Robust 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
 
 Model 1 (Combined)  Model 2 (2006)  Model 3 (2002) 
      
Coattails 0.391***  0.749***  0.612*** 
 {.028}  {.072}  {.066} 
      
Incumbent 17.632***  14.449***  16.435*** 
 {.702}  {1.117}  {1.072} 
      
Open Seat 9.258***  6.847***  9.038*** 
 {.703}  {.875}  {.954} 
      
White 0.216***  0.105**  0.243*** 
 {.035}  {.040}  {.044} 
      
Black 0.02  0.019  0.183** 
 {.048}  {.051}  {.071} 
      
Hispanic -0.027  -0.008  0.075* 
 {.028}  {.031}  {.034} 
      
Median Household Income 0***  0  0+ 
 {0}  {0}  {0} 
      
Education -0.086**  -0.079**  0.006 
 {.028}  {.039}  {.034} 
      
Arkansas -6.755***  4.585  -10.861*** 
 {1.567}  {2.839}  {2.186} 
      
California -2.407  -2.608  -0.392 
 {1.691}  {2.140}  {2.494} 
      
Minnesota -6.331***  1.955  -4.418+ 
 {1.421}  {2.507}  {2.435} 
      
New York -5.65***  12.479***  -15.381*** 
 {1.545}  {3.260}  {2.354} 
      
Oklahoma 1.506  19.597***  -3.163 
 {1.689}  {3.300}  {2.363} 
      
Tennessee -0.502  18.344***  -5.691** 
 {1.654}  {3.366}  {2.369} 
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Texas -0.396 0.283 -5.238* 
 {1.427}  {1.898}  {2.262} 
      
Wyoming 4.195**  23.352***  2.295 
 {1.886}  {4.243}  {2.628} 
      
Constant  3.98  -8.946+  -9.727 
 {3.955}  {5.359}  {5.304} 
      
R-Squared .652  .743  .641 
      
N 1395  652  743 
 
 Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 8.  Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Vote Received by Republican 
State Legislative Candidates in States Where the Republican Gubernatorial 
Candidate Won  
 
 
Model 1 (Combined) 
 
Model 2 (2006) 
 
Model 3 (2002) 
      Coattails 0.548*** 
 
0.665*** 
 
0.497*** 
 
{.025} 
 
{.033} 
 
{.036} 
      Incumbent 16.249*** 
 
13.989*** 
 
16.892*** 
 
{.844} 
 
{.950} 
 
{1.270} 
      Open Seat 9.276*** 
 
5.287*** 
 
10.303*** 
 
{.766} 
 
{.937} 
 
{1.091} 
      White 0.167*** 
 
0.085 
 
0.312*** 
 
{.050} 
 
{.056} 
 
{.083} 
      Black 0.068 
 
0.019 
 
0.242** 
 
{.057} 
 
{.071} 
 
{.092} 
      Hispanic 0.041 
 
0.018 
 
0.113** 
 
{.031} 
 
{.032} 
 
{.051} 
      Median Household Income 0+ 
 
0 
 
0** 
 
{0} 
 
{0} 
 
{0} 
      Education -0.076* 
 
-0.069 
 
-0.017 
 
{.036} 
 
{.043} 
 
{.054} 
      Leg. Pro -16.076*** 
 
-8.637** 
 
-28.784*** 
 
{2.511} 
 
{3.260} 
 
{3.804} 
      Constant -0.468 
 
-0.665 
 
-12.606 
 
{5.051} 
 
{5.801} 
 
{8.260} 
      R-Squared 0.703 
 
0.816 
 
0.677 
      N 803 
 
391 
 
492 
 
   Note: +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Figure 1.  Graphic Representation of Gubernatorial Coattails and its Effect on the 
Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Garnered by the Republican Legislative 
Candidate 
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Figure 2.  Graphic Representation of MPI and its Effect on the Percentage of the 
Two-Party Vote Garnered by the Republican Legislative Candidate 
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Figure 3.  Graphic Representation of GIP and its Effect on the Percentage of the 
Two-Party Vote Garnered by the Republican Legislative Candidate 
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Supplemental Table 1.  MPI, GIP, and Legislative Professionalism Statistics:  
State MPI GIP Leg. Pro.  
    Alabama 50 2.7 0.071 
    Arkansas 44.1 3 0.106 
    California 42.5 3.4 0.626 
    Minnesota 51.6 4 0.169 
    New York 46.1 4.1 0.481 
    Oklahoma 54.3 3.1 0.187 
    Tennessee 50.7 3.9 0.116 
    Texas 59.6 3.1 0.199 
    Wyoming 64.8 3.3 0.054 
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Supplemental Table 2.  Maximum Effects for the Main Independent Variables:  
Variable Max Effect 
  Coattails 36.4 
  MPI 7.359 
  GIP 6.3 
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